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Abstract:  
This paper concentrates on China’s partner assistance phenomena. It adopted network analysis 
methods, task-orientated organization theories and institutional evolution theories to construct 
an analysis framework for task-orientated intergovernmental network, and apply it to analyze 
China’s partner assistance practices since the 1980s. The results show that China’s partner 
assistance virtually builds a task-orientated intergovernmental network. This network is 
evolving under overlapping, embedding and reconstructing effects. According to the emergence 
and development process of task-orientated intergovernmental network, China’s central 
government plays a critical role in this process. The relationship between nodes, the relations 
between assistance providers and recipients are not properly, many interactions among local 
governments need to be formalized.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Partner assistance is a special phenomenon in China’s intergovernmental relations. The 
development of partner assistance promotes the network trend of China’s intergovernmental 
relations. However, neither foreign researcher nor Chinese domestic scholars show interest on 
partner assistance. Although 2008 Wenchuan great earthquake attracted attentions from all 
sections of the society, there is a few of valuable research on this subject (Le, 2010, Liu, 2010). 
Overall speaking, scholars in this field focus their attention on horizontal intergovernmental 
cooperation (Feiock，2007；Savitch and Vogel 2000), and tend to apply social network 
analysis methods to discuss regional network governance (Thurmaier and Wood,2002；Leroux 
and Carr 2010；Xing，2011). We argue that assistance partner is worth more attention and is 
an important subject. This research constructs a concept of task-orientated Intergovernmental 
network, and applies this framework to study China’s partner assistance, and to make up the 
defect of the existing research.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. 
First, we review the existing literature on intergovernmental relations, mostly 
made by American and Chinese scholars, and describe the characters of task-
orientated intergovernmental relations. 
Second, the second part studies the history from the perspectives of the assistance 
providers and recipients that Tibet province received assistances from various 
regions and the history that Zhejiang province supplied assistance to backward 
areas, and discusses the emergence and development of task-orientated 
Intergovernmental network.  
Third, the third part analyzes partner assistances toward Xinjiang province, 
Qinghai province, the Three Gorges Dams areas, and the Wenchuan great 
earthquake area. Through conducting comparative case study, we find overlapping, 
embedding and reconstructing dynamics to promote the evolution of task-
orientated intergovernmental relations.  
In the analysis part, we discuss how to institutionalize and formalize the partner 
assistance, how to divide the responsibilities of central and local governments, to 
coordinate local governments in different regions, and how to improve the effect 
of partner assistance by performance evaluation. 
At last, we conclude the paper and discuss directions for further research.  
2. FROM THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS TO THE TASK-
ORIENTATED INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORK     
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Prior to the 1980s, western scholars focused on the central and sub-national relations, and then 
shift the focus from constitutional norms to the dynamics and meanwhile proposed a new 
subject as horizontal intergovernmental relations （Paul R.Dommel，1991；Helen Sullivan & 
Chris Skelcher， 2002； Julie Cencula Olberding， 2002. Chinese scholars’ research on 
intergovernmental relations surrounded three subjects, the theoretical study of 
intergovernmental relations (Lin, 1998, Xie, 2000, Yang, 2005), the vertical intergovernmental 
relations study (Zhang, 2005; Xue,2010), and the horizontal intergovernmental relations study 
(Zhang, 2003). After 20 years development, new concepts, theories including “functions and 
responsibilities isomorphism”(Zhu and Zhang, 2004), “Authorizing system” (Xue, 2010), “the 
pressure system” (Rong, 2009), “ local governmental competitions” (Liu, 2007), “local 
governmental cooperation”(Yang, 2008), “regional public governance” (Chen, 2003), 
“intergovernmental governance” (Liu, 2007), and “Holistic governance”(Zhu, 2008). These 
contributions remarkably enrich the theories of China’s intergovernmental relations. 
Meanwhile, research frameworks from other disciplines, including game theory, transaction 
cost theory have been introduced into intergovernmental relations study. However, network 
analysis method which has been used prevailingly in public policy study, public organization 
has not yet been applied in to this subject. Some scholars argue that, as China applies 
centralized system, and network analysis is characterized by de-centralized, network analysis 
method is not applicable for China’s intergovernmental problems. We consider that from the 
perspective of complex system theory and complex network theory, governmental 
organizations at various levels in fact are set in an organizational network which is essentially a 
relation network. Therefore, we can explore and build intergovernmental relation network 
theory, and use to study China’s local intergovernmental relations particularly.  
3. EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF TASK-ORIENTATED 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
The task-oriented Intergovernmental network prevails in China’s government management 
practices, especially partner assistance task-orientated Intergovernmental network. Partner 
assistance is a relation that is dominated by the central government or upper government, in 
which economically developed regions or enterprises supply assistance to backward regions 
and less competitive enterprises. Divided by the nature f assistance recipients, partner 
assistance has three modes, the assistance to border areas, the assistance to the areas suffering 
huge damage, and the assistance to major projects areas (Zhao, 2011). The implementation of 
partner assistance policies effectively narrows the gap among various regions, and plays critical 
roles to promote national unit and social stability. Meanwhile, as the policies develop, the task-
orientated intergovernmental network makes a great achievement, from simple to complex, 
from identity to diverse, from one-way assistance to mutual interaction, and evolves into a 
intergovernmental network with the extensive coverage, largest number of entities, and most 
compounded relations. The partner assistance intergovernmental relation network is worth of 
being studied.  
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4. A RECIPIENT CENTERED TASK ORIENTATED 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORK 
Since 1979, China proposed partner assistance, recipients of partner assistance include Tibet 
province, the three Gorges reservoir area, the distressed area of Guizhou province, Xinjiang 
province, Wenchuan great earthquake, Tibetan areas of Qinghai province, and other border 
areas. Assistance to Tibet province starts earliest and lasts for the longest time. Thereby, we 
select Tibet as typical case of recipient-centered partner assistance to explore task-orientated 
intergovernmental relation network.  
According to the history of assistance toward Tibet province, we divide the emergence and 
development of intergovernmental relations to five phases, 
The first phase (1979-1982), in order to facilitate the economic and social development of 
minority ethnic areas, the central government proposed at the China frontier work conference, 
April 1979 that “ to organize inner provinces and cities to support and supply assistance to 
border areas as well as minority ethnic habitations”. The conference specified that Beijing 
supplied assistance to Inner Mongolia, Hebei province supplied assistance to Guizhou province, 
Jiangsu province supplied assistance toward Guangxi province and Xinjiang province, 
Shandong province assisted Qinghai province, Shanghai provided assistance to Yunnan 
province and Ningxia province, and whole country supply assistance to Tibet. In the March 
1980, the central government convened the 1st Tibet work conference. The conference decided 
to strengthen the assistance to Tibet, but lacked specific policies to enact this decision. In May 
1980, Hu Yaobang and Wang Li headed leaders of relevant departments at the central 
government to inspect and direct work. They announced tax exemption policies and fiscal 
support policies, but again these policies were lack of specific departments or local 
governments to take responsibilities.  
The second phase (1983-1993), in August 1983, the State Council issued a decision, and 
assigned tasks to Sichuan province, Zhejiang province, and Shanghai, Tianjin to supply 
assistance to Tibet. Besides these four provinces and cities, Jiangsu province, Beijing and 
Shanxi province also take a few number of tasks to assist Tibet in November 1983. After the 
2nd Tibet work conference in 1984, to celebrate the 20 anniversaries, the central government 
asked Beijing, Shanghai ,Tianjin, Jiangsu province, Fujian province, Shandong province, 
Sichuan province, Guangdong province, the Ministry of Water and Power, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fishing, and the State Bureau of Construction Materials to help Tibet build 43 
middle and small size projects. These work promoted and deepened the assistance toward Tibet, 
and build a Intergovernmental network connecting four important cities and provinces, and 
combined the supplementary help from the central governments and other regions.  
The third (1994-2000), in July 1994, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
and the State Council convened the 3rd Tibet work conference. The conference issued the new 
decision. 14 provinces and cities built partner assistance relations with 7 cities in Tibet province. 
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Besides, 13 ministries and departments, 29 provinces and cities and 6city specifically 
designated in the state plan, state-owned enterprise built a public infrastructure system of 
energy, transportation and information, and the “62” project with impacts on agriculture, 
culture and education.  At this phase, the tasks to assistance Tibet increased remarkably, and 
the relations network among local government developed. The relation between the central 
government and Tibetan local governments was developed and consolidated.  
The 4th phase (2001-2009), in June 2001, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China and the State Council convened the 3rd Tibet work conference. At the conference, the 
central government extended the original 10 year-plan to 15 years, and added 3 provinces and 
17 state-owned enterprises to assist Tibet. Addition 29 counties in Tibet were added into the 
partner assistance program. Then, 18 provinces and cities, 61 ministries and departments and 
17 state-owned enterprises joined assistance toward Tibet. In addition, the central government 
decided to invested and built 117 projects including Tibetan section of Qingzang railway. At 
this phase, the task-orientated intergovernmental network was improved largely and these leaks 
and defects were made up gradually. 
The 5th phase (2010-present), in January 2010, the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China and the State Council convened the 5th Tibet work conference. This conference didn’t 
change the former assistance program very much, which means that the Intergovernmental 
network to assist Tibet had been set up. Meanwhile, it is worth of noting that, this conference 
emphasized Tibet needed to broaden the cooperation with inner regions (Hu, 2010). It was the 
first time that “cooperation” was prioritized. In July 2011, Xi Jingping at partner assistance 
Tibet program proposed “to improve cooperation level and explore local potentials, to reach 
mutual benefits” (Xi, 2010). This statement shows that the top leaders of the central 
government had realized that after a long period assistance, Tibet had gained economic and 
social conditions, and the assistance therefore could turn from one-way assistance to mutual 
benefits and cooperation. This new strategic arrangement increased the motivations of 
assistance providers and improved the new trend of partner assistance toward Tibet.  
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Table 1 the evolution of intergovernmental network of partner assistance toward Tibet 
 1980s 1990s 21st century 
Recipient Tibet 
autonomous  
region 
Tibet 
autonomous  
region 
7 areas Tibet 
autonomous  
region 
7areas 77counties  
Provider 4 provinces 
and cities, 
and a few 
ministries of 
central 
government 
29 provinces 
and cities, 
13ministries 
and 
departments, 
state owned 
enterprises, 
6 cities 
specifically 
designated in 
State plan 
15 
provinces 
and cities 
27 provinces 
and cities, 61 
departments 
and 
ministries at 
central 
government, 
5 cities 
specifically 
designated in 
state plan  
18provinces 
and cities  
18 provinces 
and 17 state 
owned 
enterprises 
Source: Liu Jianwen, Yang Long, From Voluntary Assistance to Mutual Benefit: A study on 
the local cooperation between Tibet and other provinces and cities, Social Science Academic 
Press, (Beijing, 2014)  
 
In the development of partner assistance toward Tibet, central government and political 
mobilization played dominant roles. Assistance providers and recipients basically moved under 
directions of the central government. The partner assistance at first focused on frontier 
development and state defense, then emphasized anti-poverty, and shifted focus to economic 
development and social stability. At present, to improve living standard, protect ecosystem, and 
to promote national unity become the focus of assistance work. 
5. THE PROVIDER-CENTERED TASK ORIENTATED 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORK 
In contrast to the limited number of the recipients of assistance, the number of assistance 
providers is much larger. Taking example of partner assistance toward Tibet, in the 1990s, 
more than 29 provinces and cities took responsibilities to assist Tibet. Not only East and 
Middle China regions, but some west regions needed to join partner assistance to supply help. 
East developed provinces were pillar of partner assistance and carried important responsibilities 
in almost all assistance programs. We select Zhejiang Province which bears long-period task of 
partner assistance and analyzes its partner assistance intergovernmental relation network. 
Accordingly to the history of Zhejiang province’s partner assistance, the emergence and 
development of its task orientated intergovernmental network can be divided into four phases.  
The first phase (1983-1991), in 1979 when the central government first proposed “partner 
assistance” policies, it didn’t assign task to Zhejiang province, and thereby its assistance work 
started since 1983. The central government pointed Zhejiang province, Sichuan province, 
Shanghai and Tianjin as the important providers of partner assistance toward Tibet. In 
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November 1983, when the central government specified the task and work of partner assistance, 
Zhejiang province took 7 assistance programs, including the feasibility study on Tibetan Naqu 
Chalong hydropower station, Lhasa Technical reform on oxygen workshop, technical reform of 
Tibetan medicine factory and so on. Afterwards, Zhejiang province took tasks to support “43” 
project of partner assistance toward Tibet program. Besides Tibet, Zhejiang province didn’t 
take task to assist other regions. Zhejiang province’s assistance toward Tibet limited in 
construction, and didn’t build one-to-one assistance relationship.  
The second phase (1992-1997), Zhejiang province was assigned more assistance task. In 1992, 
the central government made the decision to ask 20 provinces and cities, 54 ministries and 
departments, and 10 large cities to build partner assistance relations toward cities and counties 
in the Three Gorges reservoir regions. Zhejiang province took the task to assist Linpei district 
of Chongqing city, and Ningbo city of Zhejiang province helped Wuqiao developing district at 
Wangzhou district of Chongqing city. In 1994, Zhejiang province was assigned to assist Quna 
area at the Tibet autonomous region. Under the West development strategy, since 1996, 
Zhejiang province took responsibilities to assist Guangyuan city, Nanchong city and 12 
counties (districts) in Sichuan province. Ningbo city assisted 12 distressed counties in the 
southeast and southwest Guizhou province. In 1997, Zhejiang province was assigned by the 
central government to build partner assistance relation with Hetian area of Xinjiang province. 
With 6 years, Zhejiang carried 4 large partner assistance programs. The provider-centered task 
orientated intergovernmental network developed quickly.  
The 3rd phase (1998-2007), within the 10 years, Zhejiang province was not assigned new task. 
It is worth to note that the partner assistance provider and recipients changed gradually. 
Entering the 21st century, Zhejiang province emphasized more on economic and trade 
cooperation, and worked to convert voluntary assistance to mutual benefit model. In 2004, 
Zhejiang province issued “Zhejiang province 2005-2007 partner assistance work guidance”. 
This guidance pointed out that “to explore new methods and strategies of partner assistance, to 
help distressed population lift out of poverty, promote both assistance and cooperation  (Wu, 
2005). It was not only political task, but economic motivation to drive Zhejiang province to 
maintain the partner assistance relation.  
The fourth phase (2008-present), after 5.12 Wenchuan great earthquake in 2008, the central 
government made “one province helps one county” decision, and assigned Zhejiang province to 
supply assistance to Qingchuan county in Sichuan province to promote disaster recovery. After 
3 years, the central government assigned partner assistance task toward Xinjiang province and 
the Zhejiang province took task to assist Aksu and Alar cities in Xinjiang province. Meanwhile, 
the central government assigned 6 coast developed provinces and cities, 21 ministries and 
departments, and 13 state-owned enterprise to assist Tibetan area in Qinghai province. In 2013, 
the State council fixed Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province to supply partner assistance to East 
Nanzhou area, Guizhou province, and Ningbo city, Zhejiang province to South Nanzhou area, 
Guizhou province. Since 2008, the central government specified the fiscal input on partner 
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assistance of local governments. The assistance fund for Wenchuan earthquake region should 
not be less than 10% of last year’s fiscal revenue of local governments. The annual fund for 
Tibet should not less than 1‰ of last year’s fiscal revenue of local governments. As a result, 
2011 fund for Xinjiang partner assistance program increased 10%, and from 2012 to 2015, the 
fund increased 8% annually.  
 
 
Figure 1 The task orientated intergovernmental network of Zhejiang assistance partner 
relations.1 
Accordingly, the provider-centered intergovernmental network has four features. 1) This 
network follows different stages. National strategies, natural disasters, frontier problems could 
cause more task orientated intergovernmental network. 2) This network is divided by the nature 
of tasks, such as assistance toward border regions, assistance to the regions suffering 
devastating disasters, and assistance to large construction projects. 3) The relation between 
assistance providers and recipients are often affected by the interest of local governments and 
deviates from the expected goal. 4) The interaction between assistance providers and recipients 
relates to the commitment of the central government on programs. The stringer and more 
specific the policies are, the stronger the interaction between two sides becomes. As Zhejiang 
province successfully converted voluntary assistance toward recipients to mutual benefit 
assistance model, many other assistance providers imitated Zhejiang’s tactics and the central 
government didn’t forbid them.  
6. THE DYNAMICS OF TASK ORIENTATED INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
NETWORK EVOLUTION: OVERLAPPING, EMBEDDING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING 
                                                 
1 The Development and Reform Commission of the Zhejiang Province government, 
http://www.zjdpc.gov.cn/art/2011/10/25/art_470_24.html ,(2011) 
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Task orientated intergovernmental network witnesses over thirty years’ development. During 
this process, there are three important effects, overlapping, embedding and reconstructing.  
The first is overlapping effect. China’s partner assistance is quite complex, which contains both 
regular assistance and short-term assistance, both institutional arrangement that covers more 
than ten provinces and cities and assignment which only benefits a few places. The the task 
orientated intergovernmental network at macro level is composed of networks at median levels. 
The median level task orientated intergovernmental networks include the partner assistance 
toward Tibet, partner assistance toward Xinjiang, partner assistance toward Qinghai, partner 
assistance toward Three Gorges Reservoir, and task orientated intergovernmental network 
toward Wenchuan earthquake, and anti-poverty intergovernmental network. Partner assistance 
networks toward Tibet, Xinjiang, Three Gorges are large networks with broader coverage and 
long-period, which construct the foundation of nationwide task orientated intergovernmental 
network. The partner assistance toward Qinghai is in fact an extension of the Tibet network, 
and is an important supplementary support for the partner assistance toward Tibet policies. The 
partner assistance toward Wenchuan earthquake is an outcome of disaster assistance network. 
The anti-poverty is different from other five networks, but essentially enjoys the same policies 
and supports as other fives. All these median networks overlap and accumulate to build the 
large and complex nationwide network.  
Secondly, the embedding effect emphasizes imbedibility and multi-dimensional, which 
contains three features. At first, policy makers of partner assistance programs come from 
different agencies. Assistance programs toward Tibet, Xinjiang, and Wenchuan earthquake 
region were initiated by the Central committee of Communist party and the State Council. The 
partner assistance toward Three Gorges Reservoir was proposed by the Three Gorges Office at 
the State Council. The partner assistance toward Qinghai was formulated by the State 
Development and Reform Committee at the State Council. The anti-poverty task was 
formulated by anti-poverty development office at the State Council. Different authorities 
launch the partner assistance. The short-term assistance program is embedded into the long-
term and broader program. For instance, in the partner assistance programs toward Tibet , 
Xinjiang and Wenchuan earthquake regions, the decision makers assigned detailed tasks and 
requirements, which made heavy task for the assistance providers. In contrast, in the anti-
poverty programs, the performance evaluation is difficult, and therefore turns to be a light task.  
Thirdly, the reconstructing dynamic is to adjust the original partner assistance 
intergovernmental relations, especially to change the relations between assistance providers and 
recipients. Three reasons produce this reconstructing dynamic, first, the provider can not 
complete assistance task or the effect of assistance is much lower than expectation. In this 
scenario, assistance program should be revised. Secondly, the assistance priorities and 
recipients undergo changes, and therefore decision makers need to reallocate the limited 
resources and make them more effectively help the recipients. Thirdly, the change of national 
development strategies also causes transformation of partner assistance program.  There are two 
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types of change, quantitative change and qualitative change. Taking the example of South 
Xinjiang, in 1997, Aksu received assistance from Shanghai, Henan province; and Kizilsu 
Kirghiz Autonomous prefecture received assistance from Jiangxi. Kashgar received assistance 
from Tianjin and Shandong province.  Hetian region received assistance from Beijing and 
Zhejiang province. In 2010, Aksu accepted assistance from Zhejiang province. The Kizilsu 
Kirghiz Autonomous prefecture received assistance from Jiangxi and Jiangsu. Kashgar received 
assistance from Guangdong, Shenzhen, Shanghai and Shandong.  Hetian region received 
assistance from Beijing, Tianjian and Anhui province. The intergovernmental network 
underwent a large adjustment.  
 
Table 2 the Adjustment on partner assistance toward South Xinjiang. 
Recipients 
Providers 
1997-2005  2005-2010 February   2010-present  
Aksu  
Shanghai 
Henan 
Shanghai, Henan 
National Development and 
Investment company,National 
Electricity Group, 
China shipping group 
Zhejiang 
Kizilsu Kirghiz 
Autonomous prefecture 
Jiangxi 
Jiangxi, Liaoning 
China Huaneng group 
Jiangxi 
Jiangsu 
Kashgar 
Tianjin 
Shandong 
Tianjin, Shandong 
China Southern Power grid 
China Huaneng group 
China Minmetals group 
China general technology holding 
corporation 
China Netcom 
Anshan Iron& Steel Group 
Guangdong 
Shenzhen 
Shanghai 
Shandong 
Heitian 
Beijing 
Zhejiang 
Beijing, Zhejiang 
China Three Gorges Project 
Development Corporation 
China Electronics Corporation 
Beijing 
Anhui 
Tianjin 
Source: Han Lingzhi, The Partnership Assistance toward Xijiang Province and Its Influence on 
Local Economic Development, Metallurgical Industry Press (Beijing, 2014) 
7. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TASK ORIENTATED 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORK 
The central government first relies on political mobilizationto build the task orientated 
intergovernmental network. A variety of notices, orders and decisions were issued within the 
party system from the top to the bottom with broad media report. This pattern of political 
mobilization can build network swiftly, but it has limits. With over three decades’ reform and 
opening up, political ecology in China has changed. The local governments have their own 
interests which differ from the central government’s interest and concerns, and meanwhile the 
right consciousness of citizens increases remarkably. Nowadays, the real effect of political 
mobilization is far less than before.  
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Secondly, the central government depends on the promotion system to enhance the task 
orientated intergovernmental network. In order to improve the productivity of the local 
governments, the central government issues many incentive measurements, including to 
incorporate the political evaluation on of partner assistance of local officials, and provides the 
officials who participate partner assistance programs with additional approach for promotion.  
Under the centralized system, the promise of the central government is useful and will 
encourage assistance providers to pay economic costs to gain the political benefits. However, 
this incentive mechanism appears unfair when we consider the different fiscal capacity of local 
governments. The local governments with strong fiscal capacity can fill the expectation of the 
central government, while other local governments cannot reach the goal. Most of assistance 
provides belong to the later. Therefore, the task orientated intergovernmental network can’t 
operate fairly in most time.  
Thirdly, the central government usually relies on coercive power to enact task orientated 
intergovernmental network. Among the assistance recipients, many regions has horrible natural 
condition, and is not suitable for people to live. To promote economic development in these 
regions is extremely difficult, if not impossible. It will demand huge investment and take long 
time to see the outcome. Some other recipients have rich natural resources, and their local 
industries are very promising and unique. A small amount of investment can make substantial 
difference. Most of assistance providers like these recipients. The central government doesn’t 
allow providers to select recipients. This pressure system is not effective to force the providers 
to effectively supply assistance when they are not willing to do.  
8. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE JUNCTURES OF TASK 
ORIENTATED INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORK 
At first, it is easy to find “collusion between assistance providers and recipients. For instance, 
for the seek of improving government performance, both providers and recipients are inclined 
to investing limited resource into city renew, whereas input less into rural and pastoral areas.    
Secondly, there are more competitions than cooperation among assistance providers. In theory, 
assistance providers are supposed to maintain cooperation, and in fact they fail to do that. In the 
partner assistance relation, “one to one”, “two to one” and “ several to one” are the basic 
pattern of intergovernmental relations, and the later two are more prevalent. The providers 
always compete with each other. For instance, in the disaster recovery of Wenchuan earthquake, 
18 provinces and cities compete to purchase construction materials for disaster regions, which 
led to a striking rise in the construction materials of Sichuan province. In the Xinjiang case, as 
the providers were urgent to achieve success in assistance program, they invested in similar 
industries and programs, which led to homogenization of industry and overcapacity.  
Last but not the least, assistance recipients lack mechanism to coordinate and connect each 
others. In the task orientated intergovernmental network, recipients only maintain 
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administrative connections, and few interactions exist. This situation is really conductive to 
socioeconomic development and the intergovernmental network.  
9. ANALYSIS 
Applying task orientated intergovernmental network to analyze China’s partner assistance 
practice, we have four findings.  
First, the current partner assistance is less formalized. Decision makers need to build 
institutional arrangement by law making and policy making. “Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law” 
in 1984, “Three Gorges Construction Immigrants Resettlement Regulation” in 1993, and 
“Wenchuan Earthquake Recover Regulation” in 2008 all mentioned partner assistance issue. 
However, these regulations are not detailed enough, and can not respond to various problems 
arising from the reality. Overall speaking, partner assistance policy is more like a political task 
which is dominated by the central government and lacks laws and specific regulations to follow. 
If the party-state can turn “political task” to “legal obligation”, the central government can 
improve the legal status of this task and mobilize various entities to participate more actively. 
Thereby, it will essentially reduce the resistance of local government against policy 
implementation and the social pressure on this issue. It is necessary to promote legislature of 
this important public program which cost immense fiscal input, affect broad population and last 
long term （Zhu and Zhang, 2011）. 
We consider that the legislature of partner assistance should include at least five points, 1) 
under what conditions decision makers can launch partner assistance program, and which 
governments or agencies have authorities to launch assistance program; 2) which regions are 
qualified to accept assistance, and the requirement standards for the assistance providers; 3) the 
right and obligations of assistance providers and recipients; 4) the procedures, standards and 
coverage of partner assistance; 5) the termination conditions and procedures and so on. Under 
this institutional arrangement, local governments don’t merely completed political tasks, but 
also fulfill legal obligations, and ensure the procedure legitimacy.  
Secondly, the partner assistance practice exposes an important problem involving the central 
government and local government relation. In order to promote sustainable development of 
intergovernmental network, it is necessary to divide the responsibilities and borders of the 
central government and sub-national governments. 
In many countries, the investment and assistance on less developing regions are made by the 
central government, few sub-national governments participate. As a centralism socialist country, 
it is questionable whether the central government should transfer the responsibility of supplying 
anti-poverty assistance to the sub-national governments. The central government is supposed to 
play more active role to coordinate and organize instead of assigning all tasks to the local 
governments.  
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In the assistance program toward border regions, the central government should assume the 
main role to assist these backward places with hard natural conditions. In the assistance 
program targeting the regions suffering disasters, the central government and the sub-national 
governments can provide fund together, add this item into governmental budget, and build fund 
management organization to run the fund. The alternative cooperation pattern is that the central 
government contributes fiscal input and the local governments provide human resources and 
technology. To these assistance programs for great projects, the central government can use the 
fiscal capacity to address program, and the local governments make supplementary effects. 
Generally speaking, to divide the responsibilities of the central government and the sub-
national governments on partner assistance programs, it is necessary to reform the existing 
fiscal system, especially to reform the tax revenue distribution and improve the horizontal and 
vertical fiscal transfers. 
Thirdly, in order to mobilize local governments to participate task orientated intergovernmental 
network more actively, it is necessary to formalize the interaction between local governments. 
It is particularly important to promote the change of local government relations from voluntary 
assistance to mutual benefits.  To achieve this goal, the central government would better to 
promote economic and social integration, and build platform for both recipients and providers. 
The central government also needs to control over competition among assistance providers to 
reduce public resource waste. Besides, the central government could encourage assistance 
recipients to develop various regional cooperation, including to abolishing administrative 
barriers, to enhance economic and technical cooperation, to build industrial parks. These 
strategies would build solid foundation for regional economic integration, and reduce the 
exclusiveness of the intergovernmental network in regions.  
Fourthly, in order to improve the effect of the task orientated intergovernmental network, the 
decision makers should introduce modern management methods, especially performance 
evaluation. Improving governance relies on refinement management and diverse management 
methods. In the policy making process, decision makers should make resource allocation plan 
according to long-term development goals rather than emergence and accidents. Meanwhile, 
assistance providers and recipients have right to participate decision making process, and 
during the process know the right, obligations and interest comprehensively.  In addition, 
through conducting stringent, scientific and efficient performance evaluation system, the 
central government is able to improve the quality of assistance programs and the social effects 
of the assistance projects. 
Last but not the least, decision makers could learn from foreign experience to continuously 
broaden and deepen the task orientated intergovernmental network, especially to introduce 
social organizations, private enterprises, voluntaries, and other new social forces. Let these new 
social forces play active roles in assistance programs. The system needs to provide social 
organizations, private enterprises and voluntaries more fair opportunities and gradually build 
healthy cooperation institution.  
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10. CONCLUSION: 
Since the 1980s, China’s intergovernmental relations have begun showing a trend of network. 
Yet, most existing researches focus on regional cooperation of developed areas, such as 
Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta, and pay less attention to backward areas. This 
paper constructs the concept of task-orientated intergovernmental network, and applies it to 
analyze the phenomena of partner assistance, which not only helps explore theories, but also 
provide suggestions to China’s partner assistance policies in future. Partner assistance practices 
in China are quite complicated, and our innovative theoretical framework can not incorporate 
all problems. More researches are needed in this field.  
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